



## Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [support@jstor.org](mailto:support@jstor.org).

# NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW

JUNE, 1918

## THE PERIL OF THE FUTURE A VITAL QUESTION TO BE ANSWERED

BY THE EDITOR

---

STEP by step the strategic plans of German conquest are being disclosed. Long ago, we assume, all persons of information and perspicacity dismissed, if indeed they had ever accepted, the impudent pretence that Germany was forced into the war by unexpected events and undertook it in self-defence, and became convinced that she deliberately planned the war and entered it at her own chosen time for the purpose of extended if not world-wide conquests. But it has required the progress of affairs to demonstrate the full scope and purport of her plans. Hitherto the most commonly recognized and most notable scheme of national expansion in the world has been that of Russia, in seeking through two centuries of effort a commercial outlet and frontage on the high seas at a point where they are never barred with ice. That has been a great and persistent undertaking, and it has largely determined the whole trend of Russian foreign policy and has had a profound influence upon the international affairs of both Europe and Asia. Yet it is now seen to have been a comparatively trifling thing by the side of the predatory policies of the Hohenzollerns, even if we consider nothing more than the attempts of the latter to secure control of maritime highways, which have been by no means the whole or even the major part of their ambitions.

The first important step in the campaign of conquest was the partition of Poland, which Frederick the Great conceived

Copyright, 1918, by NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW CORPORATION. All Rights Reserved.

and executed largely for the sake of securing by the theft of Danzig an import frontage and a great harbor on the Baltic Sea, as also for connecting two parts of Prussia into an integral whole by seizing the territory which lay between them. The sequel to this was the seizure of the southern part of Denmark, which greatly increased Prussia's frontage on the Baltic, gave her a frontage on the North Sea, and provided her with an eligible route for an inland waterway connecting those two frontages. A little later the conquest and annexation of Hanover gave her an extended North Sea frontage.

At this point she could well afford to suspend for the time her operations in that direction, and seek strategic conquests elsewhere. She therefore turned to the east. Negotiations with the Sultan of Turkey secured concessions through which Germany was to have special privileges on the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, an outlet on the Syrian coast of the Mediterranean Sea, control of the Euphrates Valley, and an outlet on the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. That was a gigantic scheme of German hegemony clear across two continents, from the North Sea to the Indian Ocean, tapping the Mediterranean Sea by the way. Through her most subservient tool, Austria-Hungary, she at the same time planned to secure an outlet down the Vardar Valley to the head of the Aegean Sea, and by the rape of Bosnia and Herzegovina to confirm greatly the German position on the Adriatic. Further domination of the Mediterranean was sought in the attempt to seize Morocco and thus possess one side of the eastern gateway to that sea; the frustration of which attempt by France, Great Britain and the United States won for these countries the most savage resentment and hatred of the Huns.

German aggressions in the Pacific began with the attempt to crowd America and Great Britain out of Samoa and to win all those islands for the German colonial empire. Other steps in the same direction included the seizure of various lands and groups in the East Indies and Polynesia, and also an important foothold on the Chinese coast. Militant intrigues were also initiated for the acquisition of the Philippines, which were frustrated by the expedition and intrepid resolution of George Dewey; another cause of wrath against the United States.

There remained the western Atlantic and the Caribbean,

and the Isthmian Canal route between the Atlantic and the Pacific. The list of German schemes in that direction is a long one. It comprises the attempt, led by Dr. von Holleben, to meddle between the United States and Spain in the spring of 1898; and the balking of at least one of the negotiations for the American purchase of the Danish West Indies; by which means Germany hoped to prevent the extension of United States influence thither. Other intrigues aimed at the acquisition of the Dutch West Indies by Germany. The defeat of the negotiations for a canal treaty between the United States and Nicaragua in 1902 was due very directly to German influence over the then Nicaraguan minister to the United States, and the same game, with a somewhat different ending, was played at Panama. It was through German influence that Colombia was persuaded to reject the canal treaty, Germany then being engaged in an attempt to secure for herself the reversion of the old de Lesseps canal concession at Panama, intending to complete the work and make it a German canal across American soil.

All these various and variously-resulting drives at waterways and sea frontages antedated the present war. In this conflict they have been continued, together, of course, with the development of other schemes of conquest. The conquest of Belgium was effected partly as the first step in a drive at Paris and France by the route of supposedly least resistance, and also for the sake of gaining a working frontage on the British Channel. Serbia and Montenegro were conquered largely in order to promote the schemes already mentioned for German dominance on the Aegean and the Adriatic. The Baltic Provinces of Russia are being annexed to Germany in order to give her full possession of the continental shores of that sea, and the German conquest of Finland has been essayed with the object of pushing northward to the Kola Peninsula so as to gain on the Terian and Murmanian coasts frontages on the White Sea and the Arctic Ocean. The seizure of Ukrainia is intended to make the Black Sea a German Lake, and the attempt to set up a German province in the Caucasus is meant to give Germany a footing upon the shore of the Caspian.

Formidable as are these schemes of waterway domination, they are not by any means the whole of the German campaign of conquest. The prosecution of them has greatly facilitated others, one of which is now beginning to loom up

with a portentousness not surpassed by any other feature of the entire situation. In the course of the highly successful drives along the coast of the Baltic and the north shore of the Black Sea, Germany has crushed and demoralized Russia, deprived her of her sea coasts, and isolated her from the rest of Europe. Whatever may be the status and the prospective outcome of the war on the western front, it is indisputable that Germany has already completely won that on the eastern front. She has achieved the conquest of Russia, and it now rests with her to determine in what manner she shall most advantageously employ the results of that conquest.

Already she has utilized those results in three important ways. One is the withdrawal of hundreds of thousands of troops from the east for service on the western front. It is well within bounds to say that the recent drive in Flanders and Picardy would not have been undertaken but for the collapse of Russia, or, if undertaken, would not have been nearly as formidable as it was. The second is the securing of vast supplies both of food and of munitions of war or the raw material for them. Alsace and Lorraine were stolen in 1871 chiefly for the sake of their iron mines, but in seizing Russia the Huns have secured immeasurably richer mines of iron, the chief platinum mines of the world, one of the richest of oil fields, vast cotton plantations, and the granary of Europe; and much of this wealth is immediately available for the supplying of wants and for the allaying of discontent. The third way in which the conquest has been utilized is the unifying and confirming of the whole German people in support of the Government. There can no longer be complaints that the war is a failure or that it is being waged for nothing. The Imperial Government can claim that it has "made good".

Now all this is on the supposition that Germany elects to continue the war in the west, as indeed she is doing. But there is an alternative, which has been somewhat more than hinted at. That is, for Germany to content herself with her eastern conquests, which are by far the greatest ever made by any nation in modern times if not ever in the history of the world and to abandon her efforts in the west. That would mean withdrawal from France and Flanders, and fortification of the old frontier of Germany, to protect that empire in its new conquests. That would place Germany in an exceedingly strong position. We do not say that it would be im-

pregnable. But if in more than three and a half years Germany, minus her eastern army, has been able to hold the Allies in check on their own soil, what would be her capacities for defence when fighting defensively on her own soil, and plus the great force which she was able to draw from the eastern front? If she should elect to adopt such a course, the Allies would be greatly nonplussed and embarrassed. They could not logically and consistently give up the war, yet they would find the difficulties of pursuing it far greater than before.

We do not say that that is what she is going to do. But it would be foolish not to recognize the possibility of her doing so, and even the probability of it in certain contingencies. There can be little doubt that she would adopt that course in preference to confessing defeat all around and suing for peace or offering unconditional surrender. Neither can there be any doubt that the strategy of her accomplished campaign thus far has placed her in a situation in which to adopt that course would be easy and hopeful of success.

As for the potential results of such a course, they must be obvious. The Allies must either accept that settlement as an ending of the war, or must refuse to do so and continue the war for the purpose of undoing it. If they should elect the former course, Germany, reenforced with the population and the inestimably great resources of the Russian Empire, would be admirably situated to prepare herself for a renewal of the war not many years hence, in circumstances far more favorable for herself than those of 1914. Her man power, and her power in all other respects, would be vastly greater than in the present war, both positively and comparatively, while her opponents would be just so much the weaker; and she would have foes on only one side instead of on two.

These considerations would, we may confidently assume, compel the Allies to refuse to recognize that settlement and to continue the war. They would have to do so against a united and augmented Germany, backed by almost boundless resources and fighting on a single front. We must believe that the result of even such a conflict would be the overthrow of the Huns. That would be a necessity of civilization and of Christianity. But it would be a stupendous task. At the present time Russia is so disorganized as to be of little value to its conqueror. But the course which Germany has been pursuing in Ukraina indicates unmistakably that she is bent upon the reorganization and restoration of

Russia for German profit at the earliest possible moment.

In that outlook lies an immense peril—perhaps the greatest that has ever confronted the world. We have expressed faith that the Allies would now reject any proposal that would give to Germany a free hand in the East, despite the fact that she would speak as a conqueror and could well afford to make most liberal and tempting offers to the Allies in the West and even to Italy. But we have to confess that our sense of certainty with respect to the future is not strong. Assuming, as we trust we may with confidence, that the Germans have come to realize that they cannot break through and presently will begin to intrench themselves with their customary skill and thoroughness, what then? To say, as many do say, that because they will have failed to achieve their immediate purpose the war will have been won by the Allies is, to our mind, to talk nonsense. The enemy has only to “dig in” and stay there. If the most powerful military machine ever known could not pass our far less effective force, what chance have we of smashing his defenses to and beyond the Rhine this year, next year or ever, for that matter?

It is easy enough to shout “We are going to win; of course we are; anybody who suggests a possibility of our losing is a traitor,” etc., etc.; they are heartening words and we like to hear them; but *how* are we going to win? That is what we want to know.

Suppose the frightful business continues, as probably it must, for several years or even for one year and the situation remains substantially unchanged, the Allies having drawn from America and the enemy from Russia in about equal proportions, and then Germany suddenly proposes to turn back all she has won in the West and to keep only what she has won in the East, what are we going to reply? What is stricken France going to feel and even perhaps say? What, England? What, the people of America? What,—and this is the gravest question of all—President Wilson? What, ourselves, for that matter? We simply do not know and cannot foresee. But we do realize that the peril of having to face such a situation is not only, as we have declared, immense, but even perhaps far more imminent than we imagine. It is something, therefore, that we should begin to think of and to prepare for, with the utmost seriousness.

Is it not probable that the time will come when we shall

have to determine how much of the world's obligation to civilization we of this generation are bound in honor to assume and how much we are warranted in passing on to our successors?

That surely is the way we are drifting. So far as is known,—and information to the contrary, if there be any, invariably leaks out,—neither our Allies nor ourselves have formulated any plans for actually winning the war. We are simply expecting Germany to lie down. We have not even a great policy in common, except as to defensive fighting in France. Great Britain, perceiving the danger of such a situation as we have indicated arising, is eager to put Japan into Russia to head off German mobilization of the mighty man power of that distracted and prostrate country, but President Wilson refuses assent upon the ground that to do so might induce somebody to suspect the sincerity of our declarations that we seek no conquests.

Who that somebody is Heaven alone knows. It cannot be any one of the Allies; that is certain. It may, of course, be Mexico, but we hardly think so. Probably it is Germany or Turkey or both—our “adversaries,” as Mr. Baker sweetly calls them. In any case, the United States objects to and actually prevents the prosecution of the war in the East after the manner deemed most advisable, if not indeed absolutely essential, by our “associates.” We do not maintain that the President may not have satisfactory reasons for pursuing this course, but we do insist that he assumes a tremendous responsibility if, as Mr. Creel informs us, he does so merely to preserve appearances in the eyes of anybody who might pretend to mistrust our motives.

We would not for a moment distract the attention or the energies of the Government and the people from the most pressing need of hurrying men to France. On the contrary, we would concentrate all efforts to that end, not only to atone partially for our criminal negligence in the past, but to meet, so far as it lies within our power, the very exigency which we have depicted as likely to arise. Precisely as Germany “speeded up” in the hope of securing a decision in her favor before the Allies could get America in, so should America put forth every ounce of strength to help to achieve something somewhere before Germany can get Russia in.

But doing all this need not and should not prevent simultaneous consideration of other equally dangerous problems to



come, with a view to reaching correct solutions promptly. For ourselves, we rejoice to say, we find the present situation fairly satisfactory; it is the only too obvious peril of the future that fills us with apprehension.

## THE EVILS OF PARTISANSHIP

IT is a pity that we cannot recast the old adage about laws being silent amid arms, or arms silent amid laws, and say *Inter arma factiones silent*. There is need of it, now more than ever before in all our history. There has been need of it before; or at least the evils of faction in wartime have been felt. In the Revolution there were Tories. In the undeclared French war there were Gallicans and Anglicans. In the War of 1812 there was the Hartford Convention; the reputation of which is the worst thing about it. In the Civil War there were Copperheads. To-day, apart from the Pacifists and Bolsheviki and what not else, there is too great an inclination to draw party lines between the two great parties, without thought of the effect upon the national welfare.

By this we do not mean to condemn or to decry criticism of the Government or the legitimate functions of an opposition party. We believe in criticism; and God knows the Government has now and then deserved it. We believe in an opposition party, watchful, alert and outspoken. But we do not believe in criticism or in opposition that is mere nagging or attempts at destruction. They should be instructive and constructive. Particularly, we do not believe, at a time like this, in supporting the Government's policy through thick and thin just because the head of the Government belongs to your party, or in criticising and condemning it simply because you belong to the other party.

Such factionalism has not, of course, universally prevailed. Some of the strongest disapproval and criticism of the present Administration have come from members of its own party, and some of its strongest support has come from the opposition party. Yet now, with a general election looming in the distance, there is an obvious inclination to draw party lines sharply and to seek party advantage at the polls—we will not say, at the cost of national interests, but at least without so far exalting them above mere party considerations as we could wish.

We have said that this has been done before. It is interesting to recall what happened in 1862, though without any suggestion that it should be repeated. Faction raged fiercely against the Administration at that time, not in spite of but because of Lincoln's war policy. Dissatisfaction and denunciation prevailed. The one supreme issue was whether the Government, in the midst of the great war, was to be supported or not. On that issue there was an almost nationwide reaction against the President and his policy. The great free States of the North went against him—New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois. The Democratic opposition in the House of Representatives was increased from 44 seats in the Thirty-seventh Congress to 75 in the Thirty-eighth, and the Republican majority was reduced to only twenty. In fact, only the three "Border States" saved the Republicans from being placed in the minority and saved the Administration from having to face a hostile majority in the House. Lincoln's shrewd policy toward Maryland, Kentucky and Missouri, and the presence of Federal troops in them, caused those States to return Republican delegations and thus saved Congress for the Administration. Two years later, in 1864, there was a still greater landslide in the other direction, the Administration being overwhelmingly supported.

It must be recognized that our governmental system, as differentiated from the systems of European States, gives not merely opportunity but also some measure of provocation for such factional movements. That is because we have fixed terms for Congress, fixed dates for general elections, and an Executive irresponsible to Congress—save in extreme cases, of impeachment. Whether we wish it or not, therefore, we must have a Congressional election every second year, and when an election is held, it is extremely difficult to suppress or to prevent factional rivalries. In Great Britain it is possible to avoid such an opportunity for partisanship by the simple expedient of extending the Parliamentary term. The present British Parliament was elected in December, 1910, for a term of not more than five years, and met in January, 1911; so that it has already exceeded its normal term by more than two years. In such fashion, quite impossible here, the rousing of party passions in a general election, and the danger of an enforced and perhaps detrimental change of administrative policy are avoided; and

they may continue to be avoided until after the end of the war.

While thus a stability and continuity impossible here are secured there, the British—as also the French—system provides for a degree of flexibility and responsiveness to public sentiment and adaptation to changing needs also impossible under our system of a fixed Executive and irresponsible Ministers. While Parliament remains unchanged, numerous changes have been made in the Cabinet, and doubtless will hereafter be made whenever they seem desirable. That is because the Prime Minister and his colleagues, unlike our President and Cabinet, have no fixed terms, but have a tenure dependent upon the will of Parliament. There can be no question that the Cabinet changes which have occurred in both Great Britain and France have been beneficial and have resulted in increased efficiency in the prosecution of the war. What changes would have occurred here, had the Executive been dependent upon Congressional approval, may be an interesting subject for conjecture. It is quite conceivable, however, that one or two changes might advantageously have been made.

There can, of course, be no thought of changing our system at this time, if indeed it is ever deemed desirable so to do. We must continue with fixed terms and with irresponsible executives. But it may well be submitted, both to political leaders and officials and to the people, whether it is not possible for us, in this time of supreme need, voluntarily and in a measure informally to secure for ourselves the chief advantages of the one system while retaining the form of the other. We must have a Congressional election this year. But it should be possible for us to exercise a restraint upon partisan passions and ambitions, so that the aim of all will be not to win a majority for this or that party, but to secure the election of a House composed of the best men—the best men for the present crisis—regardless of party affiliations. Similarly it would be commendable and honorable in the Executive, although quite secure against removal by a hostile vote, to seek continually to command the confidence and approval of the representatives of the people.

In such fashion, while retaining our present system, with its undoubted advantages, we should also enjoy the advantages of the other systems. We should have a continuity and stability of policy, and yet a flexibility and a responsiveness to the will of the people. We should avoid the spectacle of

patriots lambasting each other at the hustings instead of slaying the Huns in the trenches.

## ENEMY SPEECH MUST GO

THE speech of the Hun must be abolished in America. That is evidently the widespread popular judgment, backed up and enforced to an increasing extent by official authority. We referred last month to the then steadily growing movement for the exclusion from the schools of German textbooks obviously designed as agents of Teutonic propaganda, and for the discontinuance of the teaching of the German language, unless to a limited extent in some of the higher grades. That excellent movement is meeting with a gratifying measure of success, and it is now being appropriately complemented with another for the suppression of the German periodical press. Some of the foremost German newspapers in the country have voluntarily suspended publication or gone out of existence altogether—if we may call that voluntary which is done under overwhelming moral compulsion or in prudent anticipation of legal constraint. In many places, including some of the largest cities, newsdealers will no longer handle German papers, and in some places there have been issued municipal ordinances or administrative decrees forbidding under penalty the sale of them.

This movement is being much discussed, pro and contra, a few prominent American papers affecting to consider it intolerant and short-sighted; though apparently on altogether mistaken grounds. The notion seems to prevail with them that the purpose of the suppression of the German press is to prevent German propaganda, which is quite erroneous, and which, if it were true, would stamp the movement as futile. Of course, German propaganda should be suppressed and prevented, by any means which may be found necessary. But it would probably be not at all necessary to abolish the German press for that purpose, since it is of quite insignificant importance as a propagandist. Its utterances can be watched just as carefully and just as thoroughly as those of the English-printed press, and can be dealt with in the same way. Moreover, German papers are read only by Germans, and it is not so much to them that Germany aims to present her propaganda as to Americans. Thus one line of propaganda in an English-printed paper would be more effective

for Hunnish purposes than a column in a German sheet.

It is therefore not for that reason that the German press is denounced and is to be abolished, but rather because its existence is at all times inimical to American national unity. It retards the growth of Americanism among a numerous class of immigrants and their descendants. It prevents or delays the political assimilation of naturalized citizens, and makes for the perpetuation of an alien element in the state. Such things are great evils. It is obviously desirable for all immigrants to become not merely legally naturalized but also mentally and spiritually acclimated and assimilated, so that they will think American thoughts and get into practical and controlling sympathy with American institutions and with the spirit of American democracy.

That desirability is generally conceded, excepting by Germans. They too generally deny and resist it. Of all the immigrant elements of our cosmopolitan population, Germans have ever been the most insistent upon retaining the language of the Old Country together with its manners and social customs, and have been most reluctant to become thoroughly Americanized. In consequence, there have long existed in various parts of the country populous German colonies, in which German is almost exclusively spoken and read, together with great German societies and leagues existing in all parts of the country, the avowed object of which has been to perpetuate German speech and German customs in this country, and to keep the affections of Germans in America fixed upon the transatlantic Fatherland. Nor are the members of these colonies and societies, and the readers of German papers all actual immigrants. They are largely the children and more remote descendants of immigrants. Thousands of people who were born in this country and whose progenitors for several generations were American citizens, speak and read the German language by choice, and cherish German customs and German ideals above those of the United States.

That is an exceedingly undesirable state of affairs, and it is very intimately associated with the maintenance of the German press in this country. It is thus associated in a dual manner, as both cause and effect. It is largely the cause of the existence of the German press, because it creates a demand for it. The German press in America exists because there are so many people who want it and are ready to sustain it. On the other hand, this large alien population is in a sense

an effect or a result of the German press, because that press, by supplying the wants and catering to the sentiments of immigrants and their children encourages them to neglect to learn English and to remain alien in mind and spirit.

How great an evil this is may be seen from the examples of other lands. There are various bi-lingual or polyglot countries in the world, and in every one of them the diversity of language has militated against national unity and has been a fruitful source of trouble. That has been the record of Canada, where of all countries in the world there is the most excuse for duality of speech. In South Africa the language question was for years one of the most formidable causes of friction between Afrikaner and Outlander. In Belgium the difference in language has been one of the chief causes of disagreement between Fleming and Walloon. Austria-Hungary has long been notorious for its numerous language-problems, which have frequently led to government crises and to violent revolts.

Like causes produce like effects; and with all our patriotic pride we cannot maintain that this country is so superior or so exceptional as to be exempt from the common rule. We do not want, we must not have, such language problems in America. To avoid them it will be well to discourage as far as possible all alien prints, save as they may be desired to serve a temporary purpose. When numerous immigrants come hither who are unable to read English, it is doubtless better that they should have papers in their own language than none at all. But the existence of those papers should not in the least restrain them from learning English as rapidly as possible, and when they have done this they should substitute English for foreign papers. To regard the alien press as a permanence, intended to cultivate and confirm the permanent use of foreign tongues in America, is thoroughly reprehensible and indicates a lamentable failure to understand the spirit of the American Republic.

Entirely apart from all this, however, and quite regardless of what may become of the other alien press, this thing seems quite indisputable: That when we are at war with a country, whose avowed object is the subversion of our civilization and the substitution of its own, it is worse than folly to tolerate the continued and active existence of an agency which, voluntarily or involuntarily, makes for sympathy with that country. The patrons of the German press in the

United States either are or are not loyal. They sympathize either with America or with Germany. If they are not loyal, if they are pro-German in their sympathies, then without hesitation they should be treated as enemies and should be deprived of their alien prints. On the other hand, if they are loyal, if they sympathize with America against Germany, they should demonstrate that fact by renouncing German prints and German speech and identifying themselves with the nation in language as well as in all other respects. In either case, the alien enemy tongue should be silenced.

### WHERE WE LET JUSTICE FAIL

ANOTHER international tribunal of justice has come to naught. Perhaps it is too much to say that that at The Hague has entirely failed. Monstrously flouted and defied and temporarily crushed into nothingness it has been, by the brutal treason of the Hun; but we must hope that after the Blond Beast has been slain the great court, founded amid so high and noble aspirations of humanity, will be rehabilitated in far more than its former strength. For the time, however, and for the greatest occasion which the world has ever known, that court and all the fine conventions which surrounded it, have failed in utter nothingness.

The second failure is of lesser magnitude, and has passed with immeasurably less notice, yet in itself it is of much importance and it reflects upon this country a reproach of responsibility which we should gladly have escaped. We refer to the abandonment of that Central American Court of Justice which was designed to be, and which for a time actually was, to the five Central American Republics what the Permanent Tribunal at The Hague was to be to all the world. Indeed, the lesser court was in intent and organization the more perfect and relatively the more potent of the two.

There was much need of it. Those five states had for a hundred years had a peculiarly troubled history. Therefore their resources had remained undeveloped, their progress had been checked, and they had become a byword among the nations. In this court it was purposed to end their troubles by assuring the unbroken prevalence of peace and justice among them through the substitution of law for violence. Never did a community of nations more gracefully, confidently or

auspiciously submit themselves to a mutual moral suzerainty.

In that fine achievement the United States was peculiarly interested. It was under moral obligations to be, as atonement for the past. For it must be confessed that this country had not dealt well with its southern neighbors. At the very beginning it had discouraged the splendid aspirations of the Panama Congress. Later through the deviltries of Walker, the buccaneer, it had incurred unmeasured resentment and suspicion. At other times it had shown itself more ready to exploit sordidly than to aid generously. It was therefore gratifying to have our Government invite the five states to hold a conference under its benevolent auspices at Washington, and there, with its moral participation, to enter into treaties for their common welfare.

That conference was epochal; in no respect more than in the establishment of the court at San Jose. For the first time in the history of the world a company of sovereign states, "for the purpose of maintaining unalterable peace and harmony in their relations, without in any case being obliged to have recourse to the employment of force," created an international tribunal composed of jurists who were to devote their entire attention to its duties, and bound themselves to submit thereto for settlement "all controversies and questions which might arise among them, of whatsoever nature they might be, in the event that their respective chancelleries had not been able to reach an agreement." We are not sure that in its external activities the United States ever did a nobler thing than when it acted as moral sponsor for that achievement.

It was ten years ago that the court thus established began its work, and it promptly proved itself as efficient in practice as it was exalted in theory. Numerous causes were submitted to it, some of them of a character that without it would probably have provoked destructive war. In fact, it was recognized by all that at least two international wars were averted by its jurisdiction, as well as several domestic insurrections. Its judgments were rendered promptly, and were unhesitatingly accepted as authoritative and binding. It presented for some years to the world an unprecedented and inspiring spectacle of once turbulent states dwelling harmoniously under the sway of a public law analogous to private law—an example which the world might well have emulated.

But a few weeks ago that tribunal was abandoned and



dissolved, with no promise of its ever being restored; and for that catastrophe it is difficult entirely to free the United States from blame. The chief cause of offence was the treaty which was made between Nicaragua and the United States in 1913, to some provisions of which the other states objected. Thus it was held that Costa Rica, Salvador and Honduras fronted upon the Bay of Fonseca equally with Nicaragua—as they certainly do—and that therefore Nicaragua's cession or leasing to us of islands in that bay and commanding all its shores was a matter of legitimate concern to those states. Again, Nicaragua conceded to us the sole right to construct an interoceanic canal across her territory; while it is notorious that the San Juan River, which would certainly be a part of that canal, forms the boundary between Nicaragua and Costa Rica and is therefore half owned by the latter state.

It would be idle to pretend that these expressions of concern on the part of the three states were not well founded. That fact was practically conceded by our own Government when the Senate, in ratifying the treaty, stated that nothing in it was intended to affect any existing rights of those states. But that well meant declaration was really in itself offensive, since it was practically an agreement between the United States and Nicaragua concerning the interests of other nations; which should, of course, have been extended so as to include those nations. It naturally did not satisfy them, and they asked the United States to let the matter be passed upon by The Hague. We must feel a large measure of regret and shame to say that this request was refused by our Government.

As a last resort, the three states carried the case to the Central American Court of Justice, which decided the suits of Costa Rica and Salvador in their favor. Nicaragua, feeling secure in the quasi protectorate of the United States, denied the authority of the court and disregarded its judgments. After that there was of course only one thing to do. A court repudiated and flouted by its own makers could not longer exist.

For this unhappy ending we must hold ourselves trebly responsible. Our first error was in making such a treaty with Nicaragua without at the same time negotiating with the other states which, by our own admission, were legitimately interested in some of its terms. A capable diplomat should have perceived at the outset that Nicaragua had no monopoly of the Bay of Fonseca or of the San Juan River, and would

have deemed it just and politic to consult the states which shared her interest therein. There is little doubt that the three would have been ready to listen to proper representations on the subject, and to have come to equitable terms which would have made our position there much stronger than it could possibly be under a treaty made with only a single Power.

The next error was in so cavalierly refusing to submit the case to the tribunal at The Hague, and thus repudiating our own professions and, worst of all, throwing the dispute back to be fought out among the Central American States themselves. While reference of it to the San Jose court was doubtless proper, it would have been still more appropriate to send it to The Hague.

Finally, we erred in not exerting diplomatic influence to compose the controversy, after it had been carried to the Central American Court and Nicaragua had shown her unfortunate inclination to disregard that tribunal. It should have been possible for us, even at that eleventh hour, to satisfy the just demands of Honduras, Costa Rica and Salvador, and to have saved the San Jose court from being discredited and dissolved. Whether it is now possible to undo the mischief already done, and to reestablish the court, is a grave question, which our Government cannot morally afford not to try to answer in the affirmative. It would be an everlasting reproach to us to have that tribunal vanish after ten years of beneficent existence, because of our own inept or sordid diplomacy.

## AMERICAN PROPAGANDA NEEDED

THERE is urgent need of American propaganda in the Allied and neutral countries. It may seem strange to say so. Americans have traditionally been reputed experts in the art of blowing their own horns. Among ourselves, indeed, there is plenty of talk. Perhaps there is more talk than information; yet in spite of the official ostrich-attitude we fancy that reading, reflecting and clear-minded folk are getting an increasingly comprehensive notion of what is and what is not going on. But talk among ourselves and knowledge among ourselves are very different things from information about us among other nations.

A year ago or less we were talking fifteen to the dozen

about having anywhere from twenty to fifty thousand airplanes in service by this time, and about having a million and a half trained soldiers marching toward the Rhine. Of course, intelligent Americans, to the manner born, discounted all such flub-dub pretty much as it deserved. They knew that while such achievements were what we should perform, there wasn't a ghost of a chance of our doing them. But people "over there" didn't discount it. They took such talk at its face value. They had heard and seen so much of our boasted American enterprise and energy that they were quite prepared to expect any achievement by us, and certainly were inclined, as they had a right to be, to expect us to fulfil those promises.

And now Sidney Low tells them that after more than a year of our participation in the war we have precisely one airplane—just one, count it!—in France, and that Great Britain and France will have to continue to bear the burden of the war for a considerable time yet, before America can take any decisive part in it. In that he tells the truth, and the people "over there" believe him, though against their own wishes; and they wonder why there is so vast a difference between our promises and our performances. It is natural and indeed inevitable that they should thus wonder, because all the explanations which are familiar to us are quite unknown to them. They heard of our promises, and now they hear what Sidney Low says about our non-fulfilment of them, but they have heard nothing between the two. No wonder that they think it most almighty strange. We should hate to say out loud what they would be quite justified in thinking about it; and about us.

We need, therefore, American propaganda. We need that the American purpose and attitude in the war shall be made clear, and that our progress and in some cases lack of progress shall be frankly and truthfully reported and explained. To cite a few specific cases: Our Allies should be informed, not merely as Sidney Low has done it, that we have only one airplane "over there", but also why there has been so exasperating a delay, and what a chance there is of better results now that a practical and capable man has been put at the head of the air craft business. In like manner, they should be informed of the reasons for delay in shipbuilding, and of the difference between Schwab and Denman, or Hurley, and what is likely to come of the change.

In other words, there should be international co-ordination, in popular knowledge as well as in military command. We are all agreed that it was a fine thing to make Foch Generalissimo. It would be impossible to extend the same principle to civil government. But at least it would be possible to have all the allied nations completely informed of the doings of the others. There is an old saying and a true one that it is a fatal mistake for a defendant to mislead or to deceive his own lawyer. But it is certainly as bad for a Nation to deceive or at any rate to fail to inform fully its own allies.

We have been fully informed concerning our Allies. They long ago saw to that. They sent authoritative commissions hither to tell us what they were doing. Some of them maintain here permanent bureaus, commissions, or what not, of information, which are continually at work. They have done admirable work; tactful, helpful, all but indispensable. They have conduced to a high degree of understanding on our part of the condition, prospects and purposes of our Allies, and, consequently, to such appreciation and confidence as should always prevail among allies if their cooperation is to be effective.

That is precisely the sort of work which needs to be done by ourselves and for ourselves in European countries, especially in England and France; and we are not sure but that the need of it is greater than was the need of European propaganda here. That is because Americans as a rule have been and are much better informed about Europeans than Europeans are about Americans. Objectively, we are cosmopolitan; subjectively we are provincial. We are pretty well informed about the world at large; and we vainly imagine that all the world is as well informed about us. But it isn't. The intelligence which European countries receive concerning American affairs through the press is so meagre and ill-proportioned as to be little better than worthless, when indeed it is not actually misleading and mischievous.

Time was when we appreciated this need, and met it. In the days of the Civil War the Government was superbly served by Adams at London and by Dayton at Paris. But they were not enough. Their work was not merely supplemented but worthily complemented by that of our "un-official commissioners," such as August Belmont, Thurlow Weed, Bishop McIlvaine, Archbishop Hughes and Henry

Ward Beecher. The services of these men were simply inestimable in practical value. They expounded and pleaded the American cause as it could not otherwise possibly have been done. To officialdom, to business men and financiers, to social leaders, to intellectual leaders, and to the masses of the people, their appeal was direct with the force of personality, and it was effective. Of Mr. Beecher, whose mission ranged from visiting the Queen at Windsor to speaking to riotous mobs of half-starving workingmen at Manchester and Liverpool, it has been said that he confirmed the Sovereign and converted the subjects.

We need such work to-day, no less than we needed it then. It cannot, obviously, be done by our stated ambassadors, any more than it could have been done fifty-odd years ago; though, of course, it must be done under unmistakable official authority. Colonel House cannot do it all. Even such a unique superman as his amazing panegyrist portrays in the *New York Evening Post* would not be sufficient for the task, in addition to the multifarious other duties which he is supposed to perform at Washington, D. C., at Dallas, Texas, and Heaven only knows where not. Besides, he addresses himself to Kings and Presidents and Chancellors and Prime Ministers. But there are others who also need to be addressed. We cannot ask him to bear a message to the people. Yet that message must be borne.

There is at Washington a vast and costly establishment known as the Committee on Public Information. In its condition of chronic creelismus it may be a question whether its information is greater than its misinformation, or perhaps its obfuscation. But its existence affords an apt suggestion of the nation's greater need. That is, of a suitable agency of public information, not for Americans, who do not need it, but for the Allied and neutral peoples, who do most sorely need it, and who need it not for their own sake but for ours. They can, perhaps, get along very well without understanding us; but can we get along without being understood by them? If "coordination" is the talisman of success, is it not desirable to have coordination, not merely among the various departments of our own Government, and not merely among the various Allied Governments, but also among the Allied peoples who stand behind those Governments and without whom the Governments would be futile and impotent?

We believe that one of the most creditable and most profitable things that our Government could do, would be to invite, perhaps informally or even formally, as a commission, two or three representative citizens to take the lead in a systematic American propaganda in the Allied and neutral countries. They should be men representative not merely of the Government and certainly not merely of a party, but, in the amplest and most unmistakable sense, of the American people and of their spirit in this war. Their purpose should be not to whisper in the ears of distinguished personages or to essay any of that secret diplomacy which we have renounced and repudiated, but to make American policy and American purposes known in the widest and therefore most effective manner, so that friends and foes alike may justly understand what is meant by America's participation in the war.

There is no man in the nation so eminent or so pre-occupied that he would not be honored by such a mission and that he should not be ready and eager to accept it. There is none who is suited for it and whose undertaking of it would be of value to the nation, whose political antecedents or whose partisan affiliations should debar him from being chosen for it. "It's war we're in, not politics," and it is in ungrudging recognition of that fact that patriotic propaganda should be directed.

## SAVINGS AND GAINS OF WAR

WAR is not all waste. The enormous sums which are being raised by taxes and loans, which are being appropriated by Congress, and which are being expended by the militant departments of the Government, are not all to be lost, blown away in powder and shot and sunk to the bottom of the sea. Some of them will, of course, thus be disposed of. There is an appalling amount of waste, of necessary as well as of wanton destruction of property; more, proportionately, in this war than in any other. Uncounted millions of dollars worth of shells and of other devices for use exclusively in war are being utterly destroyed. All this is in addition, of course, to the unspeakable ravages on the land, the razing of cities and forests and orchards, and the supreme loss of human life.

But not all of the money will be thus used. Not all the

cost and effort of war is lost. Much of it, far more of it than we are likely to think, is of permanent value and profit in peace. By our so-called war expenditures we are conferring vast benefits upon the world entirely apart from that of merely winning the war—which is the greatest benefit which can at this time be bestowed. Note, for example, the work of the Shipping Board, upon which hundreds of millions of dollars are being expended. That is done on the immediate account of the war. If it had not been for the war it would not have been done at all. And the hundreds of ships which are being built will be used first of all to help us win the war. But they will afterward, for a much longer time, be used in the commerce of years of peace.

For years we have been lamenting, and with cause, our lack of an adequate mercantile marine and our consequent decline to insignificant rank among the commerce-carriers of the high seas. It will be a happy and most gratifying achievement to have that marine, lost to us in a former war, far more than replaced and America restored to more than her former rank, through the exigencies of another war. It would of course have been monstrous to plunge us into the war just for the sake of that achievement. But now that we are in the war for other reasons, it would be folly not to improve fully our opportunities in that respect, and in doing a great war work to do a comparatively great work for peace.

It is a great gain that as a result of this war we are becoming far more self-reliant as a nation and, in the noblest meaning of the term, more self-sufficient than ever before. Hitherto we have been dependent upon foreign lands for many essential articles which we could and should have supplied ourselves at home, if only we had had the ingenuity, the enterprise, the gumption. We have, for example, been looking to Germany for dyes and many other chemicals and drugs, of which the raw materials, ironically enough, came from our own country. If the war had not occurred, we might have gone on indefinitely in that fashion, dependent upon an alien land for necessities of industry and also of health and life. But when the war cut off that source of supply, through sheer necessity we set ourselves about the work which we should have done long before, and the result is that we are now in a fair way of supplying our own wants, perhaps even better than they were supplied by Germany. That great gain is a by-product of the war.

The war is teaching us to practice intensive agriculture, and to improve all the land. The nation has been awakened to the discreditable fact that our margin of food production beyond our own actual domestic needs is very narrow, because we let so much of our land lie waste, and because we do not get as much from it, acre by acre, as we should; not more than half as much as Germany. The necessities of the war, emphasized by scarcity of food and high prices, have set us pretty vigorously to mending our ways. Waste land is being cultivated, and cultivation is being made more thorough, so that presently we may be making two bushels of potatoes or what not to grow where only one bushel grew before. Doubtless we ought to have done this without the stimulus of war, but we did not; and therefore we must regard with gratification the doing of it as another of the by-products of the war, of immense prospective value to us in the coming years of peace.

We are learning economy and thrift. It used to be said, not without truth, that a French family could live well on what an American family wasted. We are now learning to correct such habits, partly through the stress of high prices and partly under legal compulsion, and are effecting savings of hundreds of millions of dollars a year. This, too, we ought to have done without the war, but did not. The war has driven us to it, and we must therefore offset the enormous wastefulness of war with this great correction of the wastefulness of peace.

It seems probable that we shall also learn, because of the necessities of the war, to utilize far more fully some of our sorely neglected natural resources. The scarcity of fuel last winter set men to considering ways and means of making use of the gigantic water power which in many parts of the country is neglected and is running to waste, and the congestion of the railroads has already caused the Government to turn to the rivers and canals as supplementary or complementary channels of transportation. Our neglect of these latter has been one of the most discreditable anomalies of our economic history. Nature has endowed us with such a multitude of natural waterways as no other land enjoys, needing nothing but a little improvement to fit them for use; and also with a unique opportunity for the construction of artificial waterways of inestimable service. Yet for years we have not only failed to improve our opportunities, but



have actually been going backward and abandoning the few waterways which we once utilized. Our chief enemy in this war, though not nearly as well endowed and adapted as we, has more than three times as great a system of inland waterways as we, and it is a fact of universal acknowledgment that to those waterways she owes a great part of her marvellous industrial and commercial achievements in time of peace, as well as her marvellous efficiency in mobilization and transport in time of war. It is not the least of the good services of the war that it is rousing us, through necessity, to give to this matter the attention which it deserves.

These are some, by no means all, of the good effects of the war upon our national economy. They cannot justify the evil of the imperial wretch who precipitated the war, and they cannot compensate us for the irreparable losses of the war. But they do afford an appreciable degree of consolation, and also of inspiration, in the knowledge that through the processes of the war we are promoting the industries, the profits and the blessings of peace.